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This Occasional Paper is devoted to reflections on
Justice Thurgood Marshall, who died on January 24,
1993. The following articles were written by University
of Chicago Law School faculty who served as law clerks
to Justice Marshall-Assistant Professor Elena Kagan,
during the 1987 Term, and Karl N. Llewellyn Professor
of Jurisprudence Cass R. Sunstein, who clerked for him
during the 1979 Term.

For Justice Marshall
Elena Kagan*
A few days after Thurgood Marshall's death, I stood
for a time at his flag-draped casket, then lying in
state at the Supreme Court, and watched the people
of Washington celebrate his life and mourn his passing. There would be, the next day, a memorial service for the Justice in the National Cathedral, a
grand affair complete with a Bible reading by the
Vice President and eulogies by the Chief Justice and
other notables. That service would have its
moments, but it would not honor Justice Marshall as
the ordinary people of Washington did. On the day
the Justice's casket lay in state, some 20,000 of them
came to the Court and stood in bitter cold for
upwards of an hour in a line that snaked down the
Supreme Court steps, down the block, around the
corner, and down the block again. The Justice's former clerks took turns standing at the casket, acting as
a kind of honor guard, as these thousands of people
filed by. Passing before me were people of all races, of
all classes, of all ages. Many came with children and
spoke, as they circuited the casket, of the significance
of Justice Marshall's life. Some offered tangible tributes-flowers or letters addressed to Justice Marshall
or his family. One left at the side of the casket a yellowed slip opinion of Brown v. Board of Education.'
There never before has been such an outpouring of
love and respect for a Supreme Court Justice, and
there never will be again. As I stood and watched, I
felt (as I will always feel) proud and honored and
* Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School; law
clerk to Justice Marshall, 1987 Term.
' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

1

grateful beyond all measure to have had the chance
to work for this hero of American law and this extraordinary man.
I first spoke with Justice Marshall in the summer
of 1986, a few months after I had applied to him for a
clerkship position. (It seems odd to call him Justice
Marshall in these pages. My co-clerks and I called
him "Judge" or "Boss" to his face, "TM" behind his
back; he called me, to my face and I imagine also
behind my back, "Shorty.") He called me one day
and, with little in the way of preliminaries, asked me
whether I still wanted a job in his chambers. I
responded that I would love a job. "What's that?" he
said, "you already have a job?" I tried, in every way I
could, to correct his apparent misperception. I yelled,
I shouted, I screamed that I did not have a job, that I
wanted a job, that I would be honored to work for
him. To all of which he responded: "Well, I don't
know, if you already have a job . . . ." Finally, he
took pity on me, assured me that he had been in jest,
and confirmed that I would have a job in his chambers. He asked me, as I recall, only one further question: whether I thought I would enjoy working on
dissents.
So went my introduction to Justice Marshall's
(sometimes wicked) sense of humor. He took constant
delight in baffling and confusing his clerks, often by
saying the utterly ridiculous with an air of such sobriety
that he half-convinced us of his sincerity. (There was
the time, for example, when he announced sadly that
he would have to recuse himself from Gwaltney of
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation.2 When we
pressed him for a reason, he hemmed and hawed for
many minutes, only finally to say: "Because I 1-o-o-o-o-v-e
their ham." When we laughed, he assumed an attitude of great indignation and began instructing us on
proper recusal policy. It was early in the Term; perhaps we may be forgiven for thinking for a moment
that, after all, this was not a joke.) He had an endless
supply of jokes, not all of them, I must admit, appropriate to print in the pages of a law review. And he
was the greatest comic storyteller I have ever heard,
or ever expect to hear. This talent, I think, may be
impossible to communicate to those never exposed to
it. It was a matter of timing (the drawn-out lead-up, the
pregnant pause), of vocal intonations and inflections,
2 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
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and most of all of facial expressions (the raised brow,
the sparkling eyes, the sidelong glance). Suffice it to
say that at least once in the course of every meeting
we had with him (and those were frequent), my coclerks and I would find ourselves holding our sides
and gasping for breath, as we struggled to regain our
composure.
Thinking back, I'm not sure why we laughed so
hard-or rather, I'm not sure why Justice Marshall
told his stories so as to make us laugh-because most
of the stories really weren't funny. To be sure, some
were pure camp. (When Justice Marshall was investigating racial discrimination in the military in Korea,
a soldier demanded that he provide a password; the
hulking [and, of course, black] Marshall looked down
at the soldier and asked, "Do you really think I'm
North Korean?" And when assisting in the drafting
of the Kenyan Constitution, the Justice was introduced to Prince Philip. "Do you care to hear my
opinion of lawyers?" Prince Philip asked in posh
British tones, mimicked to great comic effect by
Justice Marshall. "Only," Justice Marshall repliedbefore the two discovered mutual ground in a taste
for bourbon-"if you care to hear my opinion of
princes.") But most of the stories, if told by someone
else, would have expressed only sorrow and grimness.
They were stories of growing up black in segregated
Baltimore, subject to daily humiliation and abuse.
They were stories of representing African-American
defendants in criminal cases-often capital cases-in
which a fair trial was not to be hoped for, let alone
expected. (He knew he had an innocent client,
Justice Marshall said, when the jury returned a sentence of life imprisonment, rather than execution.)
They were stories of the physical danger (the lynch
mobs, the bomb-throwers, the police themselves)
that the Justice frequently encountered as he traversed the South battling state-imposed segregation.
They were stories of prejudice, violence, hatred, fear;
only as told by Justice Marshall could they ever have
become stories of humor and transcending humanity.
The stories were something more than diversions
(though, of course, they were that too). They were a
way of showing us that, bright young legal whippersnappers though we were, we did not know everything; indeed, we knew, when it came to matters of real
importance, nothing. They were a way of showing us
foreign experiences and worlds, and in doing so, of
3

reorienting our perspectives on even what had
seemed most familiar. And they served another function
as well: they reminded us, as Justice Marshall thought
all lawyers (and certainly all judges) should be
reminded, that behind law there are stories-stories of
people's lives as shaped by law, stories of people's
lives as might be changed by law. Justice Marshall
had little use for law as abstraction, divorced from
social reality (he muttered under his breath for days
about Judge Bork's remark that he wished to serve on
the Court because the experience would be "an intellectual feast"); his stories kept us focused on law as a
source of human well-being.
That this focus made the Justice no less a
"lawyer's lawyer" should be obvious; indeed, I think,
quite the opposite. I knew, of course, before I became
his clerk that Justice Marshall had been the most
important-and probably the greatest-lawyer of the
twentieth century. I knew that he had shaped the
strategy that led to Browm v. Board of Education and
other landmark civil rights cases; that he had
achieved great renown (indeed, legendary status) as a
trial lawyer; that he had won twenty-nine of the thirtytwo cases he argued before the Supreme Court. But
in my year of clerking, I think I saw what had made
him great. Even at the age of eighty, his mind was
active and acute, and he was an almost instant study.
Above all, though, he had the great lawyer's talent (a
talent many judges do not possess) for pinpointing a
case's critical fact or core issue. That trait, I think,
resulted from his understanding of the pragmatic-of
the way in which law worked in practice as well as
on the books, of the way in which law acted on people's lives. If a clerk wished for a year of spinning
ever more refined (and ever less plausible) lawschool hypotheticals, she might wish for a clerkship
other than Justice Marshall's. If she thought it more
important for a Justice to understand what was truly
going on in a case and to respond to those realities,
she belonged in Justice Marshall's chambers.
None of this meant that notions of equity governed Justice Marshall's vote in every case; indeed,
he could become quite the formalist at times. During
the Term I clerked, the Court heard argument in
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.' There, a number of
Hispanic employees had brought suit alleging employ487 U.S. 312 (1988).
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ment discrimination. The district court dismissed the
suit, and the employees' lawyer filed a notice of
appeal. The lawyer's secretary, however, inadvertently omitted the name of one plaintiff from the notice.
The question for the Court was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction over the party whose
name had been omitted; on this question rode the
continued existence of the employee's discrimination
claim. My co-clerks and I pleaded with Justice
Marshall to vote .(as Justice Brennan eventually did)
that the appellate court could exercise jurisdiction.
Justice Marshall refused. As always when he disagreed with us, he pointed to the framed judicial
commission hanging on his office wall and asked
whose name was on it. (Whenever we told Justice
Marshall that he "had to" do something-join an
opinion, say-the Justice would look at us coldly and
announce: "There are only two things I have to dostay black and die." A smarter group of clerks might
have learned to avoid this unfortunate grammatical
construction.) The Justice referred in our conversation to his own years of trying civil rights claims. All
you could hope for, he remarked, was that a court
didn't rule against you for illegitimate reasons; you
couldn't hope, and you had no right to expect, that a
court would bend the rules in your favor. Indeed, the
Justice continued, it was the very existence of rulesalong with the judiciary's felt obligation to adhere to
them-that best protected unpopular parties.
Contrary to some conservative critiques, Justice
Marshall believed devoutly-believed in a near-mystical sense-in the rule of law. He had no trouble
writing the TorTes opinion.
Always, though, Justice Marshall believed that
one kind of law-the Constitution-was special, and
that the courts must interpret it in a special manner.

Here, more than anywhere else, Justice Marshall
allowed his personal experiences, and the knowledge
of suffering and deprivation gained from those experiences, to guide him. Justice Marshall used to tell of
a black railroad porter who noted that he had been
in every state and every city in the country, but that
he had never been anyplace where he had to put his
hand in front of his face to know that he was black.
Justice Marshall's deepest commitment was to ensuring
that the Constitution fulfilled its promise of eradicating
such entrenched inequalities-not only for AfricanAmericans, but for all Americans alike.
5

The case I think Justice Marshall cared about
most during the term I clerked for him was Kadnas v.
Dickinson Public Schools.' The question in Kadrmas
was whether a school district had violated the Equal
Protection Clause by imposing a fee for school bus service and then refusing to waive the fee for an indigent
child who lived sixteen miles from the nearest
school. I remember, in our initial discussion of the
case, opining to Justice Marshall that it would be difficult to find in favor of the child, Sarita Kadrmas,
under equal protection law. After all, I said, indigency was not a suspect class; education was not a
fundamental right; thus, a rational basis test should
apply, and the school district had a rational basis for
the contested action. Justice Marshall (I must digress
here) didn't always call me "Shorty"; when I said or
did something particularly foolish, he called me (as, I
hasten to add, he called all his clerks in such situations) "Knucklehead." The day I first spoke to him
about Kadrmas was definitely a "Knucklehead" day.
(As I recall, my handling of Kadrnns earned me that
appellation several more times, as Justice Marshall
returned to me successive drafts of the dissenting
opinion for failing to express-or for failing to
express in a properly pungent tone-his understanding of the case.) To Justice Marshall, the notion that
government would act so as to deprive poor children
of an education-of "an opportunity to improve their
status and better their lives"'-was anathema. And
the notion that the Court would allow such action
was even more so; to do this would be to abdicate the
judiciary's most important responsibility and its most
precious function.
For in Justice Marshall's view, constitutional
interpretation demanded, above all else, one thing
from the courts: it demanded that the courts show a
special solicitude for the despised and disadvantaged.
It was the role of the courts, in interpreting the
Constitution, to protect the people who went unprotected by every other organ of government-to safeguard the interests of people who had no other
champion. The Court existed primarily to fulfill this
mission. (Indeed, I think if Justice Marshall had had
his way, cases like Kadrmas would have been the only
cases the Supreme Court heard. He once came back
487 U.S. 450 (1988).
s Id. at 468-69 (Marshall, J.. dissenting).
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from conference and told us sadly that the other
Justices had rejected his proposal for a new Supreme
Court rule. "What was the rule, Judge?" we asked.
"When one corporate fat cat sues another corporate
fat cat," he replied, "this Court shall have no jurisdiction.") The nine Justices sat, to put the matter baldly,
to ensure that Sarita Kadrmas could go to school each
morning. At any rate, this was why they sat in Justice
Marshall's vision of the Court and Constitution.
And however much some recent Justices have sniped
at that vision, it remains a thing of glory.
During the year that marked the bicentennial of
the Constitution, Justice Marshall gave a characteristically candid speech. He declared that the
Constitution, as originally drafted and conceived,
was "defective"; only over the course of 200 years had
the nation "attain[ed] the system of constitutional
government, and its respect for . . . individual free-

doms and human rights, we hold as fundamental
today."' The Constitution today, the Justice continued, contains a great deal to be proud of. "[B]ut the
credit does not belong to the Framers. It belongs to
those who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions
of 'liberty,' 'justice,' and 'equality,' and who strived to
better them."' The credit, in other words, belongs to
people like Justice Marshall. As the many thousands
who waited on the Supreme Court steps well knew,
our modern Constitution is his.
6 Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial:
Commemorating the Wrong Document?, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1337, 1338
(1987).
' Id. at 1341.
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On Marshall's Legal Legacy
Cass R. Sunstein*
Was Justice Thurgood Marshall an egalitarian? Did he
believe that the Constitution should be used to produce
"equality of result" for those he happened to favor?
I write at a time when many people, especially
those in the federal judiciary, believe that both questions should be answered with an emphatic "Yes."
But it isn't so.
Above all, Thurgood Marshall will be remembered for his role in Brown v. Board of Education,'
and indeed it is in that case that one can find many
of the central elements of Marshall's conception of
the Constitution. Brown is commonly thought to
have been a case about racial discrimination. It is even
said to have established a constitutional norm of
"color-blindness." But to the participants in the case,
and to the Court at the time, the case was fundamentally about education.2 The briefs and oral argument
stressed not color-blindness, but the need for equal
educational opportunity. And the Court listened. In
the passage that Justice Marshall particularly liked to
quote, the Court said:
. Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. The author
was law clerk to Justice Marshall during the 1979 Term.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Brown was followed by Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
According to Professor Hutchinson, an early draft of the Bolling opinion stated explicitly that education is a fundamental interest for constitutional purposes. The draft read:
This Court has applied similar reasoning to analogous situations in
the field of education, the very subject now before us. Thus children and parents are deprived of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause when the children are prohibited from pursuing certain courses, or from attending private schools and foreign-language schools. Such prohibitions were found to be unreasonable,
and unrelated to any legitimate governmental objective. Just as a
govemment may not impose arbitrary restrictions on the parent's
right to educate his child, the government must not impose arbitrary restraints on access to the education which the government
itself provides.... We have no hesitation in concluding that segregation of children in the public schools is a far greater restriction
on their liberty than were the restrictions in the school cases discussed above.
Dennis J.Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in
the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 Geo. L.J. 1, 45 (1979) (citation
omitted). Professor Hutchinson reports that Justice Marshall was genuinely delighted to see that early draft, responding, "That's it! That's
what the case was about!" Personal Communication from Dennis
Hutchinson (Dec. 7, 1991).
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Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education.3
Brown was a case about education. In this, I
believe, lies the clue to understanding the wellsprings of Marshall's life, work, and vision of the
Constitution.
The long struggle by the NAACP-a struggle
within and against the "separate but equal" doctrine-was undertaken, first and foremost, with an
eye toward the achievement of equal educational
opportunity. Above all, Marshall and others objected
to a practice that would engrain second-class citizenship in children, and do so with respect to the social
service most indispensable for an equal chance in
life. Hence what seems to me the most revealing
moment in Justice Marshall's argument in Brown. In
response to a question from Justice Reed about
whether the state should consider desegregation's
potential negative impact on "law and order,"
Marshall said:
[Whites and blacks] are fighting together and
living together. For example, today they are working together in other places.

. .

. I know in the

South where I spend most of my time, you will see
white and colored kids going down the road
together to school. They separate and go to different schools, and they come out and play together.
I do not see why there would necessarily be any
trouble if they went to school together.4

3

Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.

Oral Argument, Briggs v. Elliot (Dec. 10, 1952) (companion
case to Brown), in 49 Landmark Briefs and Arguments 345-46 (Philip
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
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Marshall's early commitment to equal educational
opportunity carried over to his work on the Court. It
helps explain many of his votes and writings; it
unites a number of seemingly disparate ideas.' A conspicuous example is Marshall's greatest opinion, dissenting in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 6 a
case that has emerged as one of the most important
since Brown itself. In that case, the Supreme Court
upheld significant disparities in per-pupil expenditures in school financing in Texas. Marshall's dissenting opinion rested above all on the centrality of
education to constitutionally protected liberties.
First, Marshall said, education is connected with
freedom of speech: "Education directly affects the
ability of a child to exercise his First Amendment
rights, both as a source and as a receiver of information
and ideas, whatever interests he may pursue in life."'
Second, education is central to the system of selfgovernment: "Education may instill the interest and
provide the tools necessary for political discourse and
debate. Indeed, it has frequently been suggested that
education is the dominant factor affecting political
consciousness and participation."'
Third, Marshall argued that education is a crucial
mechanism for allowing people to overcome disadvantaged conditions. It ensures, not equality of
resources or outcomes, but a fair chance. "[T]he right
of every American to an equal start in life, so far as
the provision

..

. of education is concerned, is far too

vital to permit state discrimination on grounds as
tenuous as those presented by this record."' This is
s In 1986, at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit,
Justice Marshall repeated words I heard at the end of a clerks' reunion:
[Tihe goal of a true democracy such as ours, explained simply, is
that any baby born in these United States, even if he is born to the
blackest, most illiterate, most unprivileged Negro in Mississippi, is,
merely by being born and drawing his first breath in this democracy,
endowed with the exact same rights as a child born to a
Rockefeller.
Of course it's not true. Of course it never will be true. But I
challenge anybody to tell me that it isn't the type of goal we should
try to get to as fast as we can.
Thurgood Marshall, Address Before the Annual Judicial Conference of
the Second Judicial Circuit of the United States (Sept. 5, 1986), in
115 F.R.D. 349, 354 (1987).
6 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
7 Id. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 113 (footnote omitted).
9 Id. at 71; see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,
471 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("For the poor, education is often
the only route by which to become full participants in our society. In
allowing a State to burden the access of poor persons to an education,
the Court denies equal opportunity and discourages hope.").
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not an egalitarian theme. It is about prospects from
the start, not results in the middle.
The same themes appear throughout Marshall's
work. For him, education supplies "the basic tools
and opportunities that might enable [people] to
rise."'" Thus the Constitution should be seen to
reflect "a deep distrust of policies that specially burden the access of disadvantaged persons to the governmental institutions and processes that offer
members of our society an opportunity to improve
their status and better their lives."" Such distrust is
justified because
[a] statute that erects special obstacles to education in the path of the poor naturally tends to
consign such persons to their current disadvantaged status. By denying equal opportunity to
exactly those who need it most, the law not only
militates against the ability of each poor child to
advance herself or himself, but also increases the
likelihood of the creation of a discrete and permanent underclass. 2
Marshall was not an egalitarian. His conception of
equality was extremely old-fashioned. An outgrowth
of his experiences with segregation, that conception
involved, as its defining feature, a commitment to
equality of opportunity. In Marshall's constitutional
vision, this commitment entailed, first and foremost,
a right to equal prospects in education. But it also
required more generally an opposition to all caste systems-understood as second-class citizenship, in
which one group is systematically below others on
the basis of a morally irrelevant factor such as race,
sex, or disability. In his view, rejection of caste was
the central lesson of the Civil War Amendments:
"The intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
abolish caste legislation. When state action has the
predictable tendency to entrap the poor and create a
permanent underclass, that intent is frustrated." "
Thus the equal protection principle did not ban
all racial differentiation. It did not require colorblindness. For Marshall, this precept was ahistorical;
J., dissenting).
"Id. at 468-69.
U Id. at 470; see also Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 345-51
(1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reiterating his view that a child's
education is a fundamental interest).
' Kadnnas, 487 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
'o Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 469 (Marshall,
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it was insufficiently attuned to the particular history
behind the Civil War Amendments. The principal
point of those Amendments was not to require that
people who were similarly situated be treated "the
same." Instead, Marshall thought that the core
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was that the
government could not translate morally irrelevant
differences into a form of second-class citizenship. It
could not take skin color, or gender, and turn these
into social disadvantages for blacks or women. It is
highly misleading to say that this is a vision of the
Fourteenth Amendment that favored the "rights of
groups" over "the rights of individuals." In any effort
to dismantle a caste system, caste membership is
highly relevant to remedial policies, and precisely in
the interest of "the rights of individuals." At least
Marshall thought that government could reasonably
so believe.
It was on this ground that Marshall argued that
discrimination on the basis of disability should be
subject to special scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment." And most notably, it was on this
ground that he rejected the constitutional assault on
affirmative action. 6 For him, that assault was filled
with bitter ironies. There was no basis, he thought,
for the view that affirmative action offended the
vision of the framers of the Civil War Amendments,
who had themselves engaged in affirmative action."
Nor was invalidation of affirmative action compelled by principle. In Marshall's view, most racial
discrimination was objectionable because of its particular purposes and its particular effects-that is,
because it served to create a system of caste. When
" See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 86 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the exclusion of women from registration for
the draft is unconstitutional); Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that veterans' preference statute constitutes impermissible gender discrimination). It is notable that Justice Marshall was the most vigorous voice of
opposition, under the Equal Protection Clause, to official practices
connected to the exclusion of women from the military; he insisted
that this exclusion was part and parcel of women's second-class citizenship. Id. at 285.
'5 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
455 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16 City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517
(1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396-98.
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the use of race has quite different purposes and
effects, it should be evaluated more leniently.
To Marshall, the deepest irony of the modem
attack on affirmative action was that it ripped the hardwon victories against racial discrimination entirely.
out of their particular historical context, when it was
precisely that context that made the words ones of
opprobrium. Thus for Marshall, the constitutional
assault on affirmative action "pervert[ed] the intent
of the Framers by substituting abstract equality for
the genuine equality the Amendment was intended
to achieve.""
By "genuine equality," Marshall did not mean
equality of result. Instead, he referred to a system in
which the caste-like features of American society
had been dismantled-a dismantling that was part
and parcel of the attack, decades earlier, on Jim
Crow. Hence his unusually personal last paragraph in
Bakke:
I fear that we have come full circle. After the Civil
War our Government started several "affirmative
action" programs. This Court in the Civil Rights
Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the movement toward complete equality. For almost a century no action was taken, and this nonaction was
with the tacit approval of the courts. Then we had
Brown and the Civil Rights Acts of Congress, followed by numerous affirmative-action programs.
Now, we have this Court again stepping in, this
time to stop affirmative-action programs of the
type used by the University of California.'9
Thus far I have suggested that Marshall's constitutional vision included a commitment to equality of
opportunity, particularly in education, and a rejection of caste. Of all Justices to serve on the Supreme
Court, Marshall was also by far the most insistently
protective of poor people. Indeed, he moved very
close to a belief in a constitutional right to freedom
from desperate conditions. This right is the third and
final cornerstone in Marshall's conception of equality.
It was also connected, though less directly, with the
original wellsprings of Brown.
At the very least, Marshall believed that any system that left an identifiable class of Americans in

I

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 398.

'9 Id. at 402 (citations ommitted).
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conditions of this kind should be subject to careful
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Under
this view, no one should be deprived, without good
reason, of adequate education, police protection,
food, shelter, or medical care.20
This principle is hardly egalitarian. It merely affords
a basic minimum. It allows enormous variations in living standards. There is no evidence that Marshall
objected to such variations. But it would not permit
people to fall below a specified floor. Certainly
Marshall believed that poor people could not be
deprived of access to the basic institutions of a democratic society, including the political process, the
judicial process," and education. In an appropriate
case, I think that he would also have held that the
government could not constitutionally deprive people
of the basic means of subsistence-that it could not
allow them to fall beneath a decent minimum. 2
Marshall was not an egalitarian. But in his conception of the Constitution, courts were to assume
an aggressive role in promoting equality of opportunity. At a minimum, that role entailed vigilance over
discrimination with respect to education, probably
even a right to education; an attack on caste systems;
and a willingness to look skeptically at any state
action that allowed people to be subject to desperate
conditions.
The Supreme Court has rejected this vision of the
Constitution in all of its fundamentals. It is by no
means clear that the Court has been wrong to do
this. A serious commitment to Marshall's vision
would entail an extraordinary judicial role, one for
which the courts are quite ill-suited. There is good
evidence that courts are generally ineffective in
bringing about systematic, stable social change. 2 3
20 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 337 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259-62
(1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
21 See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 458 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
22 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508, 522 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court "has already
recognized that when a benefit, even a 'gratuitous' benefit, is necessary
to sustain life, stricter constitutional standards, both procedural and
substantive, are applied to the deprivation of that benefit"). (citations
omitted).
2 See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope 72-106 (1991). Like
Rosenberg, I am referring to broad social change through the courtslarge-scale institutional shifts, not "negative" decrees that do not
involve such shifts.
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Implementation is always required, and implementation will sometimes encounter unexpected obstacles.
Courts are ill-equipped to understand the complex
systemic effects of ad hoc intervention.
Even when courts are effective, there are serious
problems in judge-led reform from the standpoint of
democratic legitimacy. Reform through the courts may
dampen the practice of citizenship, an individual and
collective good. And if reform does not have a democratic pedigree, it may run into severe resistance. Such
resistance may in turn undermine the very causes
that the Court purports to favor. The judicial struggle
with abortion may well be an example. It is at least
plausible to think that Roe v. Wade14 demobilized the
women's movement, contributed to the defeat of the
Equal Rights Amendment, and helped create the
moral majority, in a way having quite adverse effects
for the cause of equality on the basis of sex."
In any case, the era of Brown-an era that produced
so many extraordinary developments in American
law, many of them engineered by Marshall-was an
exceptional one in American history. It had no real
predecessors. It is doubtful whether it will have any
real successors.

The capacities of the courts are one thing; the
relationship of the Constitution to American life is
another. Many Americans continue to live in desperate conditions. They are without hope, food, or
shelter. They are subject to both random and systemic criminal violence-usually from the private
sector, sometimes from the police. Blacks and women
are disproportionately victims. Many children are
without decent life prospects. A system with castelike features currently exists with respect to race, sex,
and disability. Many Americans never receive a
decent education. In educational opportunities there
are persistent, extraordinary, and unnecessary disparities, and these are correlated with race and other
moral irrelevancies.
Even if the Supreme Court of the United States
lacks the willingness, the tools, or the competence to
respond to the situation, it remains plausible to think
that the Constitution of the United States is not an
2
25

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See G. Rosenberg, supranote 29, at 336-43.
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irrelevance. Other institutions, most notably Congress, the President, and state governments, have
duties of fidelity to the founding document. Those
institutions are not burdened with the limits that
face the judiciary.
It is fully plausible to think that Marshall's vision
of the Constitution will continue to have a conspicuous place in American constitutional thought. But
increasingly, its place may be the halls of the legislatures and the bureaucracies, rather than the judiciary.
This is an extraordinary irony: More than anyone
else, Marshall is responsible for the idea that social
reform, through the courts in the name of the
Constitution, was both possible and desirable.

The last words come from Marshall himself. In
1980, the city of Baltimore erected a statute of
Thurgood Marshall. It was able to persuade him to
attend the ceremony-a real accomplishment in light
of his storied reluctance to receive public tribute. But
this was a remarkable event. Baltimore had been a
segregated city, and one of Marshall's first endeavors
after graduating from law school was to desegregate
Maryland's all-white law school. The dedication of a
statue honoring a black civil rights lawyer who had
abolished American apartheid would have been
unfathomable fifty or sixty years before.
Surely this was an occasion for celebration-of an
extraordinary life of accomplishment, and of the
remarkable achievements of the civil rights revolution. But Marshall would have nothing of it:
Some . . . feel we have arrived. Others feel

there is nothing more to do. I just want to be sure
that when you see this statue, you won't think
that's the end of it. I won't have it that way.
There's too much work to be done."
26 Dale Russakoff, Trbute to Marshall; City of Baltimore
Dedicates
Statue to Ist Native Son on High Court, Wash. Post, May 17, 1980,
at Cl.
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